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Klaus Vieweg
The End of Capitalism and its Future: 
Hegel as Founder of the Concept of a Welfare State
Abstract A key part of Hegel’s practical philosophy is his theory of civil society 
and the idea of a rational regulation of the market. This is the foundation of 
Hegel’s theory of a social state. The copyright on the notion of a modern society 
of freedom and a rational, social state belongs to Hegel. Hegel proves himself 
to be the thinker who until now has provided the most convincing foundation 
for freedom in modernity.
The theoretical foundation and at the same time bone of contention of Hegel’s 
political thought is to be found in his concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), in particular 
in his theory of civil society. The current shipwreck of deregulated capitalism does 
not mean the foundering of our journey towards a free society. Nevertheless the 
deficiencies and unsustainability of both traditional models – socialist collective 
ownership and market fundamentalism – exhibit two contradictory claims to a share 
of the wealth of nations. To take up Hegel’s project is, in essence, to aim at a new 
conception of an environmentally and socially sustainable and just society, and 
a corresponding world order. It is to further Hegel’s philosophy of freedom. 
Keywords: social state, modern society, freedom, Hegel’s practical philosophy, 
regulation of the market
In an article in the New York Times with the title ‘Hegel on Wall Street’ the 
New York philosopher J. M. Bernstein diagnoses the reasons for the failure 
of neoliberal market-fundamentalist Wall-Street capitalism and recommends 
turning to the ideas of Hegel: “the primary topic of [Hegel’s] practical philos-
ophy was analyzing the exact point where modern individualism and the es-
sential institutions of modern life meet. If Hegel is right, there may be deeper 
and more basic reasons for strong market regulation than we have imagined.”1 
In the years since Hegel was writing, the gap between rich and poor has wid-
ened so far that the very foundations of democracy are threatened. 1% of the 
population now presides over one fifth of total wealth. Over one billion peo-
ple today suffer from chronic hunger or malnutrition, as a result of which one 
dies every five seconds. One sixth of the world’s population – the so-called 
‘bottom billion’ is condemned to live in extreme poverty, while at the same 
time there are 1,826 billionaires with an aggregate wealth of $6.5 trillion.2 
1 Bernstein 2010.
2 „The World’s Billionaires“ 2016.
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That Hegel’s philosophy is highly relevant to social, economic and political 
problems is something one could already read over 100 years ago, in an ar-
ticle in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine. 
There it states that “Hegel is the most conspicuous of the liberals, a main figure 
of the liberal movement in Europe – “the true philosopher of progress, the phi-
losopher par excellence of the only true political liberty.” What American read-
ers glimpsed over a century ago is the profundity of Hegel’s practical philosophy. 
And a key part of Hegel’s practical philosophy is his theory of civil society and 
the idea of a rational regulation of the market. This, I argue, is the foundation 
of Hegel’s theory of a social state.3 Hegel’s concept of civil society, of the ratio-
nal regulation of the market and the idea of a social State will be my themes.
At the outset we may note that the pattern of thinking one finds in the Wall 
Street market fundamentalists actually shows remarkable similarities to that 
of their professed opponents, namely supporters of the People’s Republics 
– both display an untenable economism and a tendency towards state socialism. 
Today these two conceptions form an unholy alliance and lead to a dead-end. 
Both reject one of the main achievements of the 20th Century, namely the so-
cial State based on a market economy, a rationally designed, regulated cap-
italism. In so doing, these two diametrically opposed economic worldviews 
endanger the very project of modern freedom. One of the most significant 
economists of the 20th Century, John Maynard Keynes, got to the heart of this 
issue with the title of his book The End of Laissez Faire and its key finding: 
“the decadent international but individualistic capitalism … is not a suc-
cess. It is not intelligent. It is not beautiful. It is not just. It is not virtuous. 
And it doesn’t deliver the goods.”4 
The copyright on the notion of a modern society of freedom and a rational, 
social State belongs to Hegel. To demonstrate this requires a short, if by no 
means straightforward, tour round the infamous lumber room of philoso-
phy. The so-called ‘Hegelian turn’ in philosophy is on the agenda here, be-
cause Hegel proves himself to be the thinker who until now has provided 
the most convincing foundation for freedom in modernity. Since Hegel, no 
other thinker has stepped forward who is in the same league as him.
I. Civil Society as Modern Community of Market, Education 
and Solidarity
The theoretical foundation and at the same time bone of contention of He-
gel’s political thought is to be found in his concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), 
3 See Vieweg 2012.
4 Keynes, “The End of Laissez Faire” (in: Mihm/ Roubini 2010: 23).
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in particular in his theory of civil society.5 In his philosophy of right, Hegel 
was “the first to conceptualise the separation of state and society.” 6 
His overcoming of the traditional equation of civil society with State provides 
a significant contribution to a “proper theorization of modern political and 
social conditions,”7 the foundation for a modern theory of society and State.
With civil society, ethical life enters the sphere of particularity. An immedi-
ately ethical association in the form of the family is dissolved, the immediate 
unity experiences its first sublation (Aufhebung) – into a unity of reflection, 
a unity of understanding. The concrete individual person thereby wins the 
possibility of their particular self-determination, they exist “in independent 
freedom and are particular for themselves.”8 At the same time the concrete 
individual initially loses their ethical-communal determinations and enters 
the realm of contingency. At first, the concrete person is necessarily con-
scious of, and takes as their purpose, not the unity of the ethical but their 
own particularity. The immanent negativity of the ethical finds expression 
in its ‘diremption’, in its splitting into extremes. Observing this ‘loss of ethi-
cal life’, Hegel summed-up the key characteristic of civil society: it is “ethical 
life split into its extremes and lost.”9 In this ‘system of the atomistic’ the ethical 
substance mutates into a general relationship of independent extremes and 
particular interests.
Hegel sets out the idea of a modern world, an idea of freedom built on the 
notion of a modern state, an idea that underpins modern forms of life. In the 
notion of civil society we find a foundation stone for this theoretical con-
struction. Two basic elements characterise civil society: a) the principle of par-
ticularity, the concrete person who has particular ends and who comprises 
particular needs, natural desires and impulses, and b) the principle of univer-
sality, the necessary relationship between particular persons. Each particular 
person may assert themselves only through the mediation of this universality. 
What distinguishes civil society from the State is that the former is shaped 
by the market principle, a system of all-round dependence, a community of 
need and understanding, while the latter is governed by structures which 
‘sublate’ (aufheben) this market principle, by simultaneously respecting and 
overcoming the impulses and accidents of particular individuals.
The market system, Hegel tells us, cannot sufficiently regulate or control it-
self, it tends towards market fundamentalism; left to its own logic it tends, 
5 See Ferguson 1767; Smith 1776.
6 Koselleck 1989: 388.
7 Horstmann 1997: 203 ff.
8 Hegel 1997: § 523.
9 Hegel 1983: § 184.
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in the last instance, to damage or even destroy itself. As in what Hegel calls 
‘the understanding’, so it is in a state based on the understanding, the struc-
tures are “essentially unstable and tottering and the building they support 
must [without rational regulation] collapse with a crash.”10 The Hegelian State 
does not do away with the market. It respects the capitalist market order and 
grants it a role within prescribed limits. The State, however, must protect the 
market from its own immanent self-destructive power. Its task is to regulate 
this sphere, to provide it with a framework and to supervise it. 
The Hegelian State has the duty to restore the ethical life that has been ‘lost 
in its extremes’ and thus to bring the understanding to reason. The State may 
not let itself by determined by market principles.
The three moments of civil society:
1. 
The Economic “System of Needs”
Mediation of needs and the satisfaction of the individual through his or her 
work and through the work and satisfaction of the needs of all others.
Mediation of needs and their satisfaction in a system of the needs of all.
Sphere of inequality.
2. 
Constitution of Law (administration of justice)
Realization of the universality of freedom and protection of rights.
Legal equality of persons.
3. 
Oversight and Regulation – social care and provision
Provision for residual contingencies in each system and the fulfilment of 
particular interests as a common good, basis of a social State, universal pro-
vision for the welfare of individuals and for the subsistence of rights, foun-
dation for creating justice.
II. All-round Dependence in the ‘Community of Need 
and Understanding’
Individual persons are conscious of their own particularity and their be-
ing-for-themselves and take these as their own purpose – the ‘system of the 
atomistic’, in Hegel’s words. This is the principle of independent particularity, 
the “principle of the self-subsistent inherently infinite personality of the indi-
vidual.”11 Here we find a defining feature of modernity: the right to particularity 
10 Hegel 1995: § 38.
11 Hegel 1983: § 185.
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on the part of subjects, the right to subjective freedom. Only in the modern world, 
according to Hegel, do we find this form of life – civil society – intervening 
between family and State. The formation of civil society belongs exclusive-
ly to modern times. The particularity of the actor, their interests and goals, 
form an inescapable aspect of their freedom. This constitutive principle of 
civil society, namely the particularity of the individual and his or her relative 
and insufficient association with the community, represents an essential con-
stituent of a free community and the core principle of modernity. The rejection 
of this principle, in whatever form of political or economic organization, 
implies the destruction of freedom. Thus Hegel cannot be read as a critic of 
such a civil society, which for him is the sine qua non of a free society, nor can 
he be read as a critic of modernity. On the contrary, Hegel has provided the 
decisive foundations for a philosophy of modernity, a philosophy of freedom. 
However, another necessary constituent of modernity is the moment of par-
ticularity with its enormous potential for danger. Hegel’s approach provides 
a theoretical analysis of the threat civil society poses to itself and its ratio-
nal sublation in the State. Civil society as a system of torn ethical life must 
therefore preoccupy us here. The concrete person as a sum of interests and 
needs has only himself or herself for his or her purpose, but he or she exists 
in mutual relations to other particulars, in a community of concrete persons, 
and in this way particulars are supposed to be equal. They are not, howev-
er. On one side we find the selfish goal of obtaining subsistence, while on 
the other we find that our rights, welfare and subsistence are bound up with 
the rights, welfare and subsistence of all. The private person aims to satisfy 
their own merely particularistic needs and inclinations, but needs the other 
private person. They depend on each other, they have need of each other, 
they stand in a relation of external necessity to one another, they exist in a 
situation of ‘need as accidental necessity’. 
When Hegel talks of a State based on ‘understanding’ (Verstand) he is refer-
ring to its logical status, to its formal universality, its understanding-univer-
sality, to a unity that establishes understanding. The ‘understanding’ is here 
a deficient form in which universality appears. 
Particularity has the right to give itself universal existence, to develop itself 
in an all-rounded way, to realize itself. All human possibilities can be devel-
oped, including all the accidents and inequalities of birth or of fortune. On 
the other side we have an inescapable context in the form of a community 
of mutual dependence. 
The unlimited satisfaction of desires, impulses and subjective pleasures is, 
Hegel tells us, an infinite process, a bad infinity, one which encapsulates the 
logical problem of the understanding itself: desire, impulse, opinion and need 
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are all boundless. Civil society cannot, on its own, define any rational measure 
or bounds; it suffers in many ways from boundlessness. A striking indication 
of this is to be seen in the permanent instability and crisis-ridden nature of 
the industrial market economy, which is accompanied by a ubiquitous myth 
of stability and self-healing. The actual cause of boundlessness is the very 
human particularity which is a defining principle a modernity. Satisfying 
the needs of the particular person within a system of all-sided dependence 
and arbitrariness is itself accidental; it presents itself to the individual as the 
work of a mysterious, hidden power, as fate, as a lottery with happy or di-
sastrous results. In this necessary feature of civil society the arbitrariness of 
its satisfaction of human needs comes strikingly to light: our needs may suc-
cessfully be satisfied or they may not. The particular can be identical with 
the universal, or it may diverge from it. Putative freedom may turn into fa-
talism, into faith in an external necessity and civil society come to resemble 
an aggregate of necessities. 
Individual parts of this giant machinery and indeed the entire machine it-
self may break down and so hinder or prevent the realisation of needs. The 
continual possibility of economic crises is for Hegel an essential feature of 
the capitalist economy.12 Civil society thus involves the setting-free of par-
ticularity, it appears as a “battlefield of the private interests of each against 
all,”13 as a ‘theatre of debauchery and misery’.
Concrete persons can raise themselves only to formal freedom and to a for-
mal universality of knowledge and willing, they can educate themselves only in 
the sense of reflection and understanding. Education nevertheless gains an 
infinite value: in its “absolute determination” it is the only way to freedom. 
The education or formation (Bildung) of the concrete person thus presents 
a fundamental milestone on the road to freedom – only the educated and thus 
self-determining free citizen (Bürger) can guarantee the survival of a free com-
munity. Modern civil society must therefore be not only market- and wel-
fare-based but also grounded in education. 
III. Political Economy and the Regulated Market
For Adam Smith the functioning of the market was guaranteed by a mys-
terious power, the invisible hand, a process in which the egoistic and often 
conflicting interests of individual economic actors converge in a stable and 
self-regulating economic system. Out of the chaos of countless individual 
decisions arises order.14
12 See Stiglitz 2010.
13 Hegel 1983: § 289.
14 Mihm/ Roubini 2010: 61.
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From this theory derives market fundamentalism, the myth of a self-bal-
ancing, self-repairing, efficient market – “the conviction that free markets 
themselves generate economic wealth and growth” or “that markets regu-
late themselves and that the self-interested behavior of market participants 
guarantee markets’ proper functioning.”15 
Hegel respects the market as the basis of modern economies, but he finds in 
it no self-regulating structure. On the contrary, the market involves a sphere 
of the arbitrary and accidental, a context which requires rational organi-
zation (by the State) and which cannot function properly on its own.16 He-
gel points to the crisis-prone character of market mechanisms and explains 
their causes. According to Roubini, it is clear that “capitalism is anything but 
a frictionless, purring, self-regulating framework. On the contrary it is an 
extremely unstable system.”17 
Contrary to delusions that have become widespread in recent decades, delu-
sions about the stability and rationality of markets and contrary to the evan-
gelism of deregulation, privatization and liberalization, the market structure 
proves to be highly fragile, precarious, risk-laden and crisis-prone.
Hegel’s proposed solution and the set of conceptual tools he employs to this 
end prove (and he is confirmed in his solutions by present-day day economic 
theory) a major contribution to our understanding of world economic con-
ditions. The keywords here are: regulation instead of deregulation, over-
sight instead of arbitrariness and chaos, legal frameworks instead of ‘vol-
untary’ self-regulation, natural and social sustainability instead of market 
fundamentalism, rational international organisation of markets instead of 
exploitation of the Earth and the impoverishment of billions. These are the 
general outlines of a concept of a regulated market constitution, a rational 
and socially-organized capitalism. In any event the ideology of deregulation, 
with its disastrous results, needs to be abandoned. A modern market only 
functions at all with the aid of elaborate regulative institutions. With Hegel 
one can say that the idea of the market needs to be protected from the mar-
ket fundamentalists, whose gospel leads directly to the collapse of market 
structures themselves. 
IV. Regulation and Social Organization
The relative unity of the principles of particularity and universality is achieved 
in various institutions of order and regulation. Relevant here too are forms of 
‘public welfare’ and organizations based on diverse professions, interests and 
15 Stiglitz 2010: 11.
16 See Stiglitz 2010: 10 f.
17 Mihm/Roubini 2010: 66.
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locations. Society is under obligation not only to respect the formal rights of 
particular subjects but also to help realize those subjects’ right to welfare. Civil 
society as an assembly of free persons has to be not only a market economy 
but a community based on solidarity, not only an economy based on individu-
al performance but also a community based on welfare, an alliance of the soli-
tary and the solidary. Only in this synthesis can it prosper, i.e. only thus can 
it constitute a community of free beings, and guarantee their freedom. A 
meaningful functioning of civil society implies the solidary-social. Here we 
already find the foundations of Hegel’s theory of a social State, which stands 
in direct opposition to the views of market fundamentalists, for whom talk 
of social justice is a heresy and for whom giving the State a welfare function 
would destroy the market. 
Central to Hegel’s theory are the ideas of oversight, of regulation and of social 
help. These, it should be emphasized, are functional conditions of modern 
societies, they are constitutively entwined, essential categorial elements of 
Hegel’s theory of modernity. Until now, however, Hegel’s significant con-
tribution to this field has been either forgotten or neglected. But precisely 
here we find one of the major achievements of his practical philosophy: the 
conceptualizing of a regulated and socially-organized modern community, the 
foundation for a constitutional and social State based on a market system. 
Hegel insists on the unity of rights and well-being and pushes the idea that 
we address not merely formal rights but that rights must have a content – 
this content is the common good of all members of civil society. The subsis-
tence and well-being of every individual emerged at the level of the System 
of Needs only as a possibility, whose realization was dependent upon natu-
ral particularities and accidental conditions.18 But the accidents which derail 
the goal of well-being must be overcome, the particular well-being must be 
treated as a right for all and be realized. 
V. Oversight and External Regulation
A first dimension of oversight comprises legal oversight and intervention in the 
form of a guarantee of security along with a certain control and management 
of collective public action, for instance commercial or market activity. It in-
volves “general institutions […], which must have a public power,”19 and they 
must have this public power precisely because the entire set of market rela-
tions and mediations cannot be viewed and controlled by individuals alone. 
These interventions, which must be relevant and reasonable, relate firstly to 
the testing and approval of products for technical or health usage; they are 
18 Hegel 1983: § 230.
19 Hegel 2005: 217.
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undertaken by health authorities, building planning offices, bodies respon-
sible for technical safety, food safety, consumer protection, etc. Secondly, in-
tervention aimed at the rules of the market – involving oversight of all areas 
of buying and selling such as the industrial market, banking and exchange. 
In both cases, the intervention is about stipulating sensible procedures and 
preventing cases of serious violation or injustice. The health care system and 
the design of infrastructure also come under this heading.
The tasks performed by such public bodies, which we often take for grant-
ed, show that internal oversight on the part of the market is insufficient and 
that legitimation and regulation by the state, oversight by a higher public 
authority, is indispensable. Matters essential to the survival and flourishing 
of a community, such as health, environmental protection and infrastruc-
ture, must be preserved from the influence of the market principle, an idea 
that contrasts starkly with the current mania for privatization. The right to 
a share of the common wealth must be guaranteed to all individuals, each 
concrete person has the right to join in civil society, and every exclusion 
from civil society and the common wealth should be considered a crime.
VI. Social Care and Forethought – Foundations of Hegel’s 
Conception of a Social State
In thinking about our relationship with nature Hegel developed the ideas of 
concern (Sorge) and forethought (Vorsorge), in the sense of natural sustainability; 
now we move on to the terrain of social concern and care, of social sustainabil-
ity. A brief example can be given here, namely the three forms of social help 
and the interaction between them: subjective help as a first form arises out of 
individually felt moral duties, benevolence, beneficence, charity, individual 
solidarity as the moral duty to assist in times of need. A second form of social 
help is charitable or non-governmental help where individuals come together 
in a type of mutual aid and solidarity, a sphere of civic charitable engage-
ment. The word ‘charitable’ (gemeinnützig) is used here very much in Hegel’s 
sense – it is about universal usage, one harnesses the universal, and thereby 
serves the general good or the common wealth. This form of help does not fall 
under the aegis of the market principles, but neither is it a form of State aid. 
Nevertheless, while extremely important and not to be underestimated, such 
subjective forms of help remain random and accidental; there is no guaran-
tee of them lasting and so sufficient guarantees for the well-being of those 
affected are lacking. Help remains here a contingent principle, and may fail.
For this reason, individuals in need also have a right to universal, public help, 
from which arises a whole set of aid and welfare institutions, and which go 
beyond the capabilities of civil society (for example social welfare organi-
zations, child and youth welfare organizations, bodies which care for the 
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elderly and disabled – these are all forms of public-governmental solidarity). 
Today one also finds particular combinations of subjective and public help, 
sustained by engagement from their participants and by charities, themselves 
supported by public, governmental institutions. What is decisive for the gov-
ernance and resourcing of social help is, for Hegel, the instrument of taxation 
and the tax system, particularly the model of a progressive income tax, where-
by portion of one’s income, relative to one’s wealth, goes into the collective 
pot, allowing collective obligations to be fairly met. All the above-mentioned 
types of social help form the cornerstone of a social State, the most decisive 
condition for a functioning market order in a modern society – “the well-de-
signed welfare state,” as Stiglitz puts it, supports “an innovative society,”20 the 
sine qua non of freedom in the modern age.
The State, the political, then manifests itself as the ‘true ground’ of civil so-
ciety, as the presupposition of its subsistence. This notion stands diametri-
cally opposed to the thesis of Marx concerning civil society as the basis upon 
which the superstructure of the State rests. It is also in stark contrast to the 
economistic credo of the market fundamentalist Chicago Boys. It stands 
opposed to both the omnipotent fantasies of Wall Street and the deregulat-
ed capitalism of the great People’s Republic, that is, against concepts which 
threaten the foundational principle of modernity – individual freedom. Nor 
can Hegel be denounced as someone who would limit individual freedom, 
let alone viewed as a precursor of totalitarianism. 
The idea of the State as a community of free citizens, of free citizenship, 
stands at the centre of Hegel’s practical philosophy, at the centre of his think-
ing of freedom. But without the unfolding of the particular concrete person 
– with all their contradictions, especially the contradiction between their 
potential for innovation and that for destruction, and the conflict between prog-
ress and insecurity – the idea of a free community cannot be adequately es-
tablished or grounded. The protagonists of market radicalism celebrate the 
market as the holy grail of freedom, but clearly the market is a nexus of the 
arbitrary and accidental, a ‘swarm of caprice’, most spectacularly embod-
ied in the stock market on Wall Street. Thus arbitrariness and randomness 
are (inadvertently or deliberately) confused with freedom and one remains 
stuck at the level of the Understanding, of a deficient universal. Meanwhile, 
against the backdrop of the vast series of ‘capital offences’ recently commit-
ted in the financial system, the neoliberals with their promise of self-regu-
lating markets have some explaining to do. 
At least since the time of Hegel one could understand that the market, while 
forming one essential pillar of a free community, cannot alone – precisely due 
20 Stiglitz 2010: 256.
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to its determinacy – generate rational structures, and so must be rationally or-
ganized, that it requires appropriate regulatory frameworks. The market-rad-
ical mantra that “regulation kills innovation” has now lost its attraction.21 
The market is to be neither demonized nor glorified. Although it is an im-
portant enabling condition of freedom, one can in no way describe the mar-
ket itself as ‘free’. Both the deregulated capitalism of Wall Street and the bu-
reaucratic-socialist People’s Republic (or an explosive mixture of the two) 
endanger and undermine the principle of the freedom of all particular in-
dividuals that has shaped modernity. The current shipwreck of deregulated 
capitalism doesn’t mean the foundering of our journey towards a free society. 
Nevertheless the deficiencies and unsustainability of both models – socialist 
collective ownership and market fundamentalism – exhibit two contradictory 
claims to a share of the wealth of nations.
To take up Hegel’s project is, at core, to aim at a new conception of an envi-
ronmentally and socially sustainable and just society, and a corresponding 
world order. It is to further Hegel’s philosophy of freedom. Now is the time 
for such a fundamental transformation in thinking, now is the time for the 
Hegelian turn in philosophy.
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Klaus Fiveg
Kraj kapitalizma i njegova budućnost: 
Hegel kao osnivač pojma države blagostanja
Apstrakt
Ključni deo Hegelove praktične filozofije je njegova teorija građanskog društva 
i ideja racionalne regulacije tržišta. To je temelj Hegelove teorije socijalne drža-
ve. On je idejni tvorac modernog društva slobode i racionalne, socijalne države. 
Pokazalo se da je Hegel mislilac koji je do sad na najuverljiviji način postavio te-
melj slobodi u modernom dobu.
Teorijski temelj i istovremeno sporono mesto Hegelove političke misli se može 
pronaći u njegovom pojmu etičkog života (Sittlichkeit), posebno u njegovoj teoriji 
građanskog društva. Trenutni brodolom deregulisanog kapitalizma ne označava 
i potapanje našeg puta ka slobodnom društvu. Bez obzira, nedostaci i neodrži-
vost oba tradicionalna modela – socijalističkog kolektivnog vlasništva i tržišnog 
fundamentalizma – izražavaju dva protivrečna zahteva za raspodelom bogatstva 
nacija. Nastaviti Hegelov projekat je, u suštini, težnja ka novoj ideji ekološki i so-
cijalno održivog i pravednog društva, kao i odgovarajućeg svetskog poretka. To 
znači unaprediti Hegelovu filozofiju slobode.
Ključne reči: socijalna država, moderno društvo, sloboda, Hegelova praktična 
filozofija, regulacija tržišta
